




Many philosophers, from Socrates to William James or Leibniz, have conducted inquiries and constituted 
what is now called in social sciences, "fields". How can we inherit from them? And what is our specificity, as 
philosophers, in relation to the practices of the human and social sciences? Based on a field experience 
that questioned the usual routines of the inquiry, and in particular the practice of anonymity, this article 
proposes to think about how these routines have some effects  both on the people surveyed, and on the 
knowledge produced with or upon them. This gesture of questioning the practices which forces us to adopt 
other ways of addressing the situation leads the philosopher inquirer to consider his investigation as a real 
experiment, and thus it subjects the inquirer to the obligation to think of inquiry as a creative practice. On 
analysis, one realizes that it is not however proper to the philosophical inquiry, but that it is the essential 
dimension of any them, be that the scientist explicitly claims it or that she tries on the contrary to minimize  
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Out of The Books: Field Philosophy 		What	 can	 field	 philosophy	 be?	 The	 first	 step	 in	 asking	 this	 question	 might	 be	 to	subordinate	 it	 to	 another	one,	 a	question	 that	 is	 familiar	 to	philosophers:	 from	whom	should	we	inherit	our	practices,	and	how?	Philosophers	have	for	a	long	time	conducted	inquiries	in	a	manner	that	is	relatively	close	to	the	one	that	defines	a	field	enquiry.	Let	us	think	about	Socrates	and	his	alleged	epistemo-sociological	enquiry,	asking	people	what	they	 know	 and	 how	 they	 think.	 I	 am	 probably	 committing	 the	 sin	 of	 anachronism,	however	 I	 would	 suggest	 that	 Socrates,	 in	 doing	 what	 he	 did	 the	 way	 that	 he	 did,	inaugurated	 the	 typical	 gesture	we	 recognize	 as	 the	hallmark	of	most	 social	 scientists	today,	 what	 Martin	 Savransky	 calls	 the	 “ethics	 of	 estrangement.” 1 	The	 ethics	 of	estrangement,	Savransky	argues,	characterizes	the	epistemology	of	most	social	sciences,	as	 “a	 method	 of	 inquiry	 that	 consists	 in	 becoming	 estranged	 from	 the	 realm	 of	appearances	made	available	by	direct	 experience	 in	order	 to	gain	access	 to	 a	 realm	of	facts	and	causes.”2	This	ethics	of	estrangement	is	the	translation,	into	the	field	of	social	sciences,	 of	 the	 bifurcation	 of	 nature	 that	 Alfred	 North	 Whitehead	 denounced:	 “the	bifurcation	 of	 nature	 involves	 a	 mode	 of	 understanding	 whereby	 experience	 only	discloses	 that	 which	 is	 apparent,	 whereas	 the	 ‘relevant’	 factors	 in	 the	 process	 of	knowing	the	world	must	always	lie,	and	be	sought,	somewhere	else.”3			This	particular	form	of	epistemic	and	ethical	bifurcation,	which	is	well-established	in	the	social	sciences,	led	many	investigators	to	define	their	work	as	the	search	for	the	hidden	“causes”	underlying	the	conduct	of	actors	(often	under	the	notion	of	beliefs).	This	ethics	of	 estrangement	would	 take	 the	 form,	 in	 Socrates’	 case,	 of	 a	 judgment:	 you	 claim	you	know,	 you	 think	 you	 know,	 but	 this	 thinking	 and	 this	 knowing	 should	 be	 declared	illegitimate;	or,	to	put	it	in	a	nutshell,	“you	think	you	know,	but	actually,	you	don’t	know	and	you	don’t	think.”	Which	is	in	a	sense	perfectly	right:	Socrates	did	not	ask	the	people	he	addressed	to	think,	or	more	precisely,	he	created	a	device	that	inhibits	thinking	and	produced	only	mental	paralysis.	 	 In	all	 fairness	I	cannot	claim	that	the	human	sciences	repeat	this	Socratic	discourse,	but	the	effect	of	neutralizing	thought	seems	nevertheless	quite	similar.	Albeit	by	different	devices.	On	the	one	hand,	 investigators	rarely	ask	the	question	 of	 how	 the	 people	 they	 interview	 might	 be	 interested	 in	 the	 questions	addressed	to	them.	And	for	good	reason:	most	of	the	time	people,	quite	rightly,	will	not	be	 interested.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 if	 they	 were,	 not	 only	 could	 they	 question	 the	relevance	of	these	questions,	but	moreover,	if	they	do	not	question	the	relevance,	their	answers	 could	 be	 considered	 as	 “biases”:	 “these	 people	 are	 not	 representative	 of	common	sense,	because	they	are	interested!”		But	another	device,	largely	unquestioned,	seems	to	me	still	more	at	work:	that	of	anonymity.	It	is	very	difficult	to	question	this	practice,	since	its	motive	is	to	protect	the																																																									
1	Savransky,	Martin,	The	Adventure	of	Relevance:	An	Ethics	of	Social	Inquiry.	Basingstoke	and	New	York:	Palgrave	MacMillan,	2016.		2	Ibid.,	p.15	3	Ibid.,	p.15.	
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people	 being	 questioned.	 Consequently,	 to	 hear	 sociologists	 or	 psychologists	 who	defend	 its	 use,	 the	 investigator	 guarantees	 at	 the	 same	 time	 a	 certain	 “truth”	 of	 the	speech,	a	certain	authenticity	of	the	account:	people	might	be	afraid	of	the	consequences	of	what	they	could	say,	and	thus	hide	things	from	the	interviewer,	or	even	lie,	depending	on	these	consequences.	The	old	positivist	dream	of	a	truth	uninfected	by	the	conditions	of	 inquiry	 and	 the	 imperative	of	deontology	 reinforce	 each	other	here,	 to	 the	point	of	diverting	 attention	 from	 the	 issues	 underlying	 or	 accompanying	 these	 choices	 of	practices.	Since	the	official	necessity	under	which	the	practice	of	anonymity	operates	(that	is,	to	protect	people)	does	not	occur	so	much	on	the	outside,	it	occurs	mostly	inside	the	relationship	between	the	investigator	and	the	respondent.	To	put	it	simply:	the	practice	of	 anonymity	 distributes	 expertise,	 and	 builds,	 induces,	 or	 performs	 an	 asymmetry	 of	roles.		What	 seems	 obvious	 to	me	 today,	 however,	 did	 not	 immediately	 emerge	 as	 a	 logical	consequence	of	 the	 critical	 analyses	 that	 I	 addressed	 to	 social	 science	practitioners.	 It	was	because	anonymity	was	proving,	 in	particular	circumstances,	to	be	a	real	problem	and	was	putting	me	in	difficulty	that	I	began	to	question	the	imperatives	that	generally	guide	research.	At	the	origin	of	this	story,	it	was	a	matter	of	conducting	an	investigation.	It	 turned	 out	 to	 be,	 from	 the	 outset,	 very	 difficult.	 We	 –	 the	 sociologist	 Antoinette	Chauvenet	 and	 I	 –	had	 to	evaluate	 the	effects	of	 a	 therapeutic	program	of	 support	 for	refugee	families	in	camps	from	the	region	of	Split	in	the	former	Yugoslavia.	The	war	was	not	over,	and	the	conditions	of	life	in	the	camps,	we	realized,	seemed	to	prolong	without	end	the	work	of	destruction.	And	I	was	often	wondering	whether	this	inquiry	itself	was	not	part	of	this	process.	I'm	afraid	that	in	some	ways,	at	least	in	the	early	days,	that	this	was	indeed	the	case.	Still,	I	tried	desperately	to	find	a	solution	to	this	problem.	The	 story	 around	 which	 this	 reversal	 of	 perspective	 took	 place	 therefore	happened	many	years	ago	now,	in	a	refugee	camp.	I	found	myself	in	front	of	a	man	in	his	60s,	 a	 Muslim	 farmer	 originally	 from	 a	 village	 near	 Travnik,	 Bosnia.	 He	 was	 a	magnificent	 gentleman	with	 glowing	white	 hair	 and	 even	 brighter	 blue	 eyes.	We	 had	accomplished	almost	every	step:	I	had	introduced	myself,	I	had	guaranteed	anonymity,	and	we	had	discussed	the	topics	that	guided	my	investigation.	I	found	myself	in	front	of	him	 and	 I	 carefully	 noted	 down	 in	 my	 notebook	 his	 words,	 as	 translated	 by	 the	translator.	He	spoke	to	me	at	this	stage	of	the	conversation	about	the	disappearance	of	his	brother.	At	that	moment,	he	grabbed	the	pen	I	was	holding	and	said,	“You	see,	that's	what	we've	been.	You	can	take	this	pen	and	write	with	it.	Those	who	do	politics	have	written	with	us.	They	did	not	take	their	sons	to	play	with	and	send	them	to	war.	They	took	our	sons	and	wrote	the	war	with	them.	We	are	but	specks	of	dust	in	this	story.”	He	stopped	talking.	All	I	could	do	was	stay	silent,	and	I	saw	that	the	translator	was	as	perplexed	and	moved	as	me.	What	to	do	with	his	beautiful	words?	Who	would	dare	copy	the	words	of	a	poet	by	simply	saying,	“a	poet	said”?	What	this	gentleman	did	was	an	act	of	resistance:	taking	my	 pen	was	 not	 trivial.	 He	 resisted	 very	 politely,	 very	 kindly,	 and	 left	 me	 the	leisure	to	interpret	it	as	such,	or	not	to	understand,	his	resistance	to	being	a	“subject	of	investigation.”		So,	to	get	out	of	the	perplexity,	or	more	precisely	to	do	something	about	it,	I	explained	to	him:	 “your	 words	 are	 so	 beautiful	 that	 they	 cannot	 belong	 to	 me.	 We	 did	 all	 of	 our	research	 ensuring	 the	 anonymity	 of	 the	 people	 we	 were	 interviewing,	 because	 we	
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thought	it	might	give	them	confidence	and	protect	them,	and	I’m	wondering	today	if	we	were	right	to	do	so.	We	wanted	to	protect	those	who	bear	witness,	but	I	think	we	should	have	let	them	choose,	and	leave	the	question	open.	Many	of	those	I	met	told	us	that	the	sense	of	the	loss	of	dignity	was	magnified	by	the	fact	that	they	were	called,	every	one	of	them,	‘you,	the	refugees,’	like	an	anonymous	mass	marked	with	an	identity	that	they	had	not	chosen,	and	from	which	they	cannot	invent	themselves.	But,	actually,	we	did	not	take	seriously	what	they	told	us,	each	time	that	we	wrote,	in	the	anonymity	of	our	interviews:	‘a	refugee	told	me.’	I	think	we	should	have	reflected	on	the	question	of	anonymity	with	each	of	them,	and	that	we	will	have	to	do	it	from	now	on.	It’s	with	you	that	I've	learned	it.”	He	picked	up	the	pen,	 looked	at	my	outstretched	page,	 then	wrote	his	name:	 Jahija	Smajié.		The	 question	 of	 protective	 anonymity,	 which	 never	 arose,	 turned	 out	 at	 this	 very	moment	 to	 be	 a	 question	 that	we	had	 closed	 off	 too	quickly.	A	question	 closed	 to	 the	mode	 of	 secrecy	 that	 separated	 the	 things	 of	which	 one	 is	 ashamed	 and	 the	 things	 of	which	 one	 is	 proud	 (and	 that	 must	 remain	 outside);	 that	 separated	 refugees	 from	professionals	 (like	me,	 as	 I	 had	 a	 name	 that	would	 be	written	 in	 reports,	 articles	 and	later	in	a	book).4	I	had	to	learn	to	ask	this	question,	to	negotiate	it,	and	to	negotiate	the	risks	with	those	I	questioned.	The	risk	that	I	thought	I	would	have	to	avoid	was	only	one	of	 the	 possible	 risks	 –	 the	 risk	 of	 disclosing	 –	 but	 it	 prevented	 me	 from	 taking	 into	account	the	other	risk,	the	one	that	I	confronted	at	that	moment	with	Jahija	Smajié,	the	risk	 of	 “separating,”	 of	 isolating,	 of	making	 people	 talk	while	 silencing,	 of	 stealing	 the	words	 or	 of	 drawing	 them	 out	 from	 the	 speaker.	 The	 risk	 of	 retying	 the	 secret	 to	 its	etymology:	“secretus,”	to	separate,	to	isolate.	The	question	of	 anonymity	had	emerged	as	 an	 inescapable	 and	unquestionable	aspect	of	research,	and	now	I	saw	the	possible	effects.	What	I	call	the	“no	name”	effect	was	all	the	more	dramatic	in	these	circumstances,	since,	in	a	way,	anonymity	extended	what	might	be	called	a	regime	of	insult	–	“you	refugees”	–	a	regime	of	insult	that	was	all	the	more	violent	since	the	fact	of	being	named	or	considered	a	refugee	was	experienced	by	people	as	extremely	discrediting.	As	they	said	to	me:	as	someone	unworthy,	as	no	one	in	the	sense	of	being	nobody5,	a	third-world	person,	someone	from	the	other	side	of	the	world.		If,	 therefore,	 this	 effect	 is	 particularly	 terrible	 in	 these	 circumstances,	 it	 nevertheless	obliges	 us	 to	 reflect	 on	 what	 it	 can	 produce	 in	 other,	 albeit	 less	 dramatic,	 research	situations.	Let's	open	with	what	looks	like	a	paradox:	anonymity	creates	identity.	This	is	what	I	will	call	here	the	“no	name	effect”:	the	position	of	“subject”	in	an	investigation	is	created	 by	 erasing	 the	 name.	 I	mean	 “subject”	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 psychology	 gives	 the	term,	 that	 is,	 as	 an	 “anyone”	 defined	 by	 their	 lay	 position	 in	 an	 experiment.	 In	 other	words,	 it	 is	 by	 erasing	 the	 name	 that	 the	 asymmetry	 between	 the	 layperson	 and	 the	expert	 is	 constructed,	 it	 is	 by	 erasing	 the	name	 that	 the	particular	 posture	 of	 the	 one	who	will	assume	the	role	of	the	investigated	is	constructed	in	relation	to	the	person	who	is	defined	 in	 the	same	gesture	as	an	expert.	 In	a	way,	anonymity	plays	as	an	essential	element	of	the	device	in	the	form	of	an	induction	that	goes	far	beyond	that	of	a	“feel	free																																																									4	Antoinette	Chauvenet,	Vinciane	Despret	et	Jean-Marie	Lemaire,	Clinique	de	la	
reconstruction:	Une	expérience	avec	des	réfugiés	en	ex-Yougoslavie	(Paris:	L’Harmattan,	1996).	5	TRANS:	“nobody”	appears	in	English	in	the	original:	“personne	au	sens	de	nobody.”	
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to	say	anything	you	want”	or	even	a	“speak	without	fear”	that	gives	itself	as	a	motive:	be	free,	 indeed,	 your	words	will	 have	no	 consequences.	 Just	 think	 for	 two	 seconds	 about	how	people	can	perceive	and	translate	the	situation	when	told	that	their	words	will	have	no	consequence.	Do	not	misunderstand	me,	 I	am	not	conducting	an	 individualistic	or	humanistic	advocacy	 of	 recognition	 of	 “subjects”	 this	 time	 in	 the	 sense	 of	 “subjectivity”	 (as	psychotherapists	 say,	 “we	 forgot	 the	subject”):	 this	 is	a	pragmatic	and	epistemological	position.	It’s	a	pragmatic	and	epistemological	question	therefore;	here	is	the	effect	of	“no	name”	practices:	they	are	always	at	risk	of	putting	people	in	situations	where	they	are	unlikely	to	be	interesting,	and	unlikely	to	be	interested.	One	 can	 also	wonder	whether	 the	 devices	 are	 not	 really	 aimed	 at,	 or	 to	 put	 it	more	moderately,	are	not	satisfied	with,	the	fact	that	people	are	not	that	interested,	or	do	not	allow	themselves	to	actively	take	interest	in	what	the	device	proposes	to	them.	What	Mr.	 Smajié	 proposed	 to	me,	with	 his	 act	 of	 resistance,	was	 to	 change	 the	device:	to	recount	the	nightmares	and	sadness	made	him	into,	and	confined	him	within,	an	unacceptable	identity,	namely	that	of	a	victim;	instead	he	proposed	to	think	together.	He	opened	the	field	of	questions,	literally,	because	he	proposed	to	move	from	a	personal	history	to	the	history	of	a	collective.	Not	“that's	what	happened	to	me,”	but	“that's	what	happened	to	us.”	At	the	beginning	of	this	story	I	pointed	out	the	deep	uneasiness	with	which	I	was	conducting	this	investigation:	I	often	left	people’s	homes	feeling	that	I	was	participating	in	a	process	that	was	making	them	feel	even	worse.	We	had	a	chance	with	Mr.	Smajié.	But	this	chance,	we	had	to	learn	how	to	create	it.	Each	time.	Also,	at	each	subsequent	visit,	we	tried	to	grasp	it	(but	never	knowing	–	but	do	we	ever	know	it?	–	 if	we	created	that	chance	or	simply	grasped	it.	All	we	could	say	was	that	it	was	a	regime	of	attention	that	we	were	learning).	So	we	tried	to	make	every	visit	during	this	 inquiry	an	opportunity	to	 learn,	to	think.	To	those	people	who	told	us	about	the	importance	of	religion	in	their	lives,	we	said	that	it	interested	us,	and	that	we	wanted	 to	 know	 more.	 And	 the	 conversation	 was	 transformed	 into	 theological	exchanges	 and	 comparisons.	 To	 the	 one	 who	 told	 us	 that	 freedom	 does	 not	 mean	anything	if	we	cannot	afford	a	bus	ticket,	I	had	the	audacity	to	say	that	what	he	told	us	finally	made	sense	of	what	I	had	read	of	freedom	in	Sartre’s	Being	and	Nothingness,	but	that	I	had	not	understood	at	the	time.	I	say	“audacity”	because	that’s	what	first	occurred	to	me:	“you	see	where	we	are,	and	yet	you	come	to	talk	to	me	about	philosophy?”	It	was,	however,	a	rare,	rich	interview	where	the	exchange	really	meant	something.	It	was	therefore	a	matter	of	looking,	each	and	every	time,	for	the	moment	when	we	began	to	think	together.	A	continual	craft,	but	it	paid	off:	people	thanked	us,	not	just	for	paying	attention	to	their	situation,	but	for	giving	them,	during	the	time	of	the	visit,	the	impression	that	they	were	something	other	than	refugees.	And	the	conclusion	of	the	visits,	in	these	cases,	unfolded	in	a	joyous	way.	And	I	shared	this	joy,	because	I	had,	each	time,	the	feeling	that	we	had	succeeded,	together,	to	add	something	to	the	situation.	Our	inquiry	has	become	experimentation.		In	 this	 perspective,	 inquiry	 is	 both	 experience,	 in	 the	 common	 sense	 of	 the	 term,	 and	experimentation,	in	the	sense	of	both	testing	and	putting	into	continuity	an	ensemble	of	experiences.	“When	the	experience,”	writes	Joëlle	Zacs	on	John	Dewey,	“is	accompanied	by	an	awareness	of	what	 it	 ‘does’	and	 ‘transforms’	(or	 ‘creates’	as	 in	art),	 it	 is	the	new	conditions	thus	produced	which	become	an	object	of	interest,	and	which	may	eventually	lead	to	new	specific	problematic	situations,	by	the	very	fact	that	they	are	now	part	of	the	
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conditions	of	the	environment	in	relation	to	which	investigator	develops	skills,	desires,	knowledge	 or	 science.”6	An	 inquiry,	 according	 to	Dewey,	 is	 the	 set	 of	 transformations	that	 the	very	process	of	 inquiry	 imposes,	 concrete	and	existential	 transformations,	 for	the	 objects	 studied	 just	 as	 much	 as	 the	 inquiring	 subject.	 An	 inquiry,	 from	 this	perspective,	 is	 therefore	 much	 more	 a	 logic	 of	 creation,	 of	 creative	 experimentation,	than	of	discovery.	The	 inquiry,	 from	 this	point	 of	 view,	may,	 I	 believe,	 be	 a	philosophical	 gesture.	However,	 it	 is	 not	 a	 question	of	 proposing	 a	 rival	method,	 but	 rather	 of	 claiming	 that	
every	inquiry,	in	the	end,	is	an	experimental	and	creative	form,	that	it	either	assumes	as	such	 or	 that	 it	 refuses	 to	 assume;	 a	 refusal	 which	 is,	 for	 example,	 the	 case	 with	 the	positivist	sociological	approach,	which	aims	to	discover	a	reality	already	given,	already	stabilized,	with	procedures	asserting	this	stability,	with	questions	wanting	to	be	neutral,	with	a	large	and	distributed	sample,	and	a	“modest”	investigator	in	the	sense	of	Donna	Haraway’s	modest	witness,	who	disappears	behind	the	strength	of	the	data.	The	 philosophical	 inquiry	 does	 not	 pretend	 to	 do	 anything	 different:	 instead	 it	pretends	to	do	exactly	the	same	thing,	but	by	assuming	and	claiming	what	the	positivist	sociological	 inquiry	conceals	while	doing	so,	namely	the	creative	part	of	every	inquiry,	and	by	measuring	the	consequences.	The	inquiry	studies	what	it	creates	while	studying	it,	and	the	changes	it	provokes.	Experimentation	cannot	be	defined	any	better.		Accepting	 the	 inquiry	 as	 creation	 certainly	 modifies	 the	 starting	 position.	 Thus,	 the	major	 risk	 of	 many	 inquiries	 is	 that	 of	 interpretation,	 the	 act	 of	 making	 knowledge	behind	the	backs	of	those	about	whom	we	are	inquiring.	How	to	avoid	the	risks	of	this	temptation	to	interpretation?	To	avoid	this	risk,	the	investigator	will	have	every	interest	to	delegate,	as	far	as	possible,	the	theoretical	part	of	the	work	to	her	respondents;	it	then	remains	to	be	seen	 if	 the	theoretical	questions	that	 interest	us	may	 interest	 them.	The	advantages	of	this	pragmatic	method,	which	delegates	this	part	of	the	work	as	much	as	possible,	and	which	asks	the	actors	themselves	to	carry	out	the	analysis	of	the	reasons	for	thinking	what	they	think,	are	considerable:	the	researcher	is	constrained	to	be	even	more	polite	because	 she	can	no	 longer	develop	a	knowledge	behind	 the	back	of	 those	she	has	questioned.	The	 respondents,	 for	 their	part,	 can	 construct	 their	 analysis	 in	 all	confidence.7	They	will	be	invited	to	better	understand	that	they	must	take	charge	of	the	interesting	part	of	the	work.	It	is	up	to	them	to	make	the	connection	between	what	they	think	 and	what	 determines	 their	 particular	 way	 of	 thinking.8	We	 therefore	 switch,	 as	Antoine	Hennion	wrote,	analyzing	how	amateurs	define	the	relationship	to	tastes,	from	
																																																								6	Joëlle	Zacs,	“La	politique	comme	experimentation,”	in	Le	public	et	ses	problèmes	(Pau:	Presses	Université	de	Paris,	2003),	p.18.	7	The	fact	that	interpretation	always	comes	after	must	in	no	way	suggest	that	the	position	of	the	respondent	is	not	affected.	The	very	fact	of	answering	questions	about	biography,	the	traumas	of	childhood,	the	“life	stories,”	as	is	the	case	in	many	studies,	and	the	fact	that	the	respondents,	generally,	do	not	allow	themselves	to	point	out	“but	what	does	this	have	to	do	with	my	project?”	shows	that	they	submit	themselves	from	the	outset	to	the	interpretation	of	the	researcher.	8	This	is	what	I	tried	to	implement	during	an	investigation	that	I	conducted	with	Jocelyne	Porcher.	See	Vinciane	Despret,	“The	Becomings	of	Subjectivity	in	Animal	Worlds,”	Subjectivity	23:1	(2008):	123-139.	
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“critical	 analysis	 to	 pragmatics” 9 	–	 we	 do	 not	 think	 or	 act	 “because”	 of	 social	determinisms,	but	rather	“with”	them.		A	 few	 lines	back	 I	 claimed	 that	 inquiry,	 from	 this	perspective,	may	be	 a	philosophical	gesture,	that	it	is	not	a	question	of	proposing	a	rival	method	but	of	basing	itself	on	the	fact	 that,	 by	 taking	 it	 on,	 all	 inquiry	 is	 an	 experimental	 and	 creative	 form.	 And	 as	 a	philosopher,	I	claim	this	practice	and	strive	to	honour	it.	But	it	also	comes	just	as	deliberately	from	the	philosophical	gesture,	it	inscribes	itself	 in	 a	 conversation	 with	 philosophers	 who	 have	 themselves	 conducted	 inquiries,	whether	to	challenge	them	and	break	with	their	own	gesture	(like	that	of	Socrates),	or	on	 the	 contrary,	 to	 inherit	 from	 them.	 It	 is	 from	 this	 perspective	 that	 I	 assume	 the	entirely	philosophical	practice	of	summoning	philosophical	ancestors,	who	I	ask	to	guide	the	experiments,	always	cobbled	together,	to	which	my	inquiries	give	shape.	Thus,	in	contrast	to	Socrates,	I	take	inspiration	from	the	very	different	gesture	of	William	James,	conducting	his	own	inquiries,	be	it	about	religious	experiences	or	about	the	experience	of	emotions.	In	both	cases,	James	went	on	to	address	his	questions	to	the	ones	who	know,	the	ones	whose	expertise	could	help	him	to	learn	something	new	and	often	 unexpected:	 in	 the	 former	 case,	 the	 ones	 who	 cultivate	 a	 passionate,	 even	 if	problematic,	experience	of	 living	 in	a	world	where	God	matters,	and	 in	the	 latter	case,	with	 theatre	 actors,	who	 know	 about	 creating,	 discriminating,	 disclosing,	 and	 sharing	emotional	experiences	—	in	other	words,	those	who	know	how	our	emotions	may	make	us	feel.	The	inquiry	is	an	inquiry	about	the	way	some	people	cultivate	an	expertise;	how	they	hesitate,	how	they	think,	how	they	complicate	a	problem.				In	 addition	 to	 James,	 I	 would	 also	 choose	 Leibniz	 as	 an	 ancestor	 to	 inherit	 from,	 the	Leibniz	 Isabelle	 Stengers	 taught	 me	 to	 love,	 and	 more	 precisely	 the	 Leibniz	 she	introduced	 me	 to	 through	 the	 reading	 of	 a	 woman	 philosopher	 (at	 some	 point	 this	mattered	 for	 us),	 Emilienne	 Naert.10	What	 Emilienne	 Naert	 emphasized	 in	 Leibniz’s	work	 was	 in	 some	 ways	 very	 similar	 to	 what	 I	 found	 so	 inspiring	 in	 James’s	methodological	 choices:	 not	 only	 that	 Leibniz	 also	wanted	 to	 learn	 (and	 not	 solely	 to	enter	 into	polemics	 about	 the	 issue	he	addressed,	 an	 issue	 that	mattered	 to	him)	but,	like	James	will	do,	Leibniz	addressed	his	inquiry	to	the	ones	who	know,	not	by	virtue	of	being	a	mere	authority	(in	fact,	it	is	quite	the	opposite),	but	because	they	have	cultivated	a	particular	relationship,	the	relationship	of	the	“amateur”	with	the	very	issue	he	wanted	to	 learn	 about	—	 amateur	 understood	 here	 in	 the	 sense	 of	 the	 one	who	 knows,	who	develops	an	expertise,	a	love	and	a	taste	(I	am	referring	here	to	Isabelle’s	article	in	this	issue,	“Dare	to	Taste”).	Simply	said,	field	philosophy	requires	taste,	and	moreover	good	taste.			Not	only	does	Naert	provide	a	portrait	of	Leibniz	as	someone	who	is	“sincerely”	attached	to	 a	 thought	 that	 is	 not	 polemical,	 but	moreover,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 Naert	 to	 give	 full	meaning	 to	 the	 singularity	 of	 this	 philosopher	 who	 proposed	 that	 women	 should	 be	addressed	about	the	most	important	problem,	that	of	the	love	appropriate	to	give	God.	I	quote	here	 from	our	book,	Women	Who	Make	a	Fuss:	 “Thanks	 to	Naert,	we	can	 in	 fact																																																									9	Antoine	Hennion,	“Affaires	de	goût:	Se	rendre	sensible	aux	choses.”	in	Sensibiliser:	La	
sociologie	dans	le	vif	du	monde,	edited	by	Michel	Peroni	and	Jacques	Roux	(La	Tour	d’Aigues:	Éd.	de	L’Aube,	2006),	161-174.	10	Emilienne	Naert,	Leibniz	et	la	querelle	du	Pur	Amour	(Paris,	Vrin,	1959).	
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understand	 the	 meaning	 of	 Leibniz’s	 advice	 to	 the	 polemicists:	 if	 it	 is	 a	 question	 of	speaking	about	love,	it	is	necessary	to	trust	the	experience	of	women	because	they	are	competent	in	the	matter.	And	they	are	competent	not	because	they	are	‘carried	away	by	feelings’.	 Speaking	 to	women,	 to	 those	 ‘femmes	 savantes’	 of	 the	 epoch,	whom	Molière	ridiculed,	 implies	 neither	 condescension	 nor	 ‘essentialism’.	 Could	 we	 go	 as	 far	 as	 to	make	 Leibniz	 –	 the	 master	 of	 abstraction,	 who	 made	 of	 abstraction	 a	 politeness	 of	thought	and	of	politeness	a	constraint	on	creation,	and	who	was,	as	such,	“marked”	by	ridicule	–	the	prospector	of	what	could	be	another	‘genre’	of	thought?	For	if	women	are	competent	in	matters	of	love,	it	could	very	well	be	because	of	their	attention	to	manners	of	doing,	saying,	and	thinking.	Because	of	their	refusal	of	 letting	a	duty	to	 ‘speak	truth’	bar	 the	road	to	 ‘speaking	well’.	Because	they	do	not	set	 themselves	up	as	 ‘leaders	of	a	sect’	or	claim	to	silence	others	but	share	a	disinterested	love	of	language	and	thought.”11	I	would	add,	 yes,	 indeed,	 a	disinterested	 love	of	 language	and	 thought,	 but	 also	a	 real	interest	 in	 love	 or,	 more	 precisely,	 a	 real	 interest	 in	 thinking	 about	 and	 with	 love.	Because	these	women	Leibniz	was	addressing	were,	without	doubt,	interested	by	these	matters,	just	as	they	were	also	without	doubt	interested	by	the	questions	Leibniz	raised.		Making	 field	 philosophy	 means	 for	 me,	 therefore,	 to	 inherit	 from	 James	 and	Leibniz’s	gestures.	But	this	means	also	to	inherit	from	them	as	philosophers,	in	this	case	as	creators.	I	would	like	to	re-emphasize	this	essential	dimension.	A	field	does	not	pre-exist	 our	 inquiry	 as	 a	 field	 of	 inquiry	 (it	 does	 of	 course	 exist	 as	 something	 else,	 as	 a	milieu,	 as	 a	 collective,	 as	 a	 situation),	 but	 to	 address	 this	 situation	 as	 a	 field-to-be	 of	inquiry	or	of	experimentation	is,	as	Souriau	would	say,	to	promote	a	situation	in	another	mode	of	existence.			How	 to	 create	 does	 not	 have	 a	 general	 answer,	 and	we	 learn,	 from	 some	 field	workers,	 that	 each	 situation-becoming-a-field	where	 interesting	 things	 happen,	where	we	 learn	 something	 that	 comes	 to	 matter	 to	 us,	 requires	 imagination,	 tact,	 daring,	opportunism,	humour.	Making	field	philosophy	involves	then	(but	with	cautious	care)	to	learn	from	people	who	know	how	to	create	a	field,	in	the	actual	sense	of	creating.	I	will	focus	here,	however	briefly,	on	the	fieldwork	of	two	anthropologists.		The	first	one	is	the	French	ethnologist	Elisabeth	Claverie.12	Her	work	interested	me	 because	 she	 offered	 to	 those	whom	 she	 addressed	 the	most	 unexpected	mode	 of	response.	 She	 followed	 and	 questioned	 pilgrims	 on	 pilgrimage	 with	 the	 Virgin	 of	Medjugorje,	and	she	became	interested	in	the	very	sophisticated	way	they	think.	She	did	not	 ask,	 as	 social	 scientists	 usually	 do	 in	 this	 situation,	 how	 they	 believe,	 what	 they	believe,	or	even	more	than	usual	in	that	field,	“how	can	we	explain	such	an	odd	thing	as	people	believing	in	a	supernatural	being?”	She	didn’t	do	this	not	only	because	she	knew	that	she	would	not	learn	anything	new	and	interesting	from	these	kinds	of	questions,	but	all	 the	more	because	she	could	anticipate	the	effect	of	these	questions.	She	knew	that	there	are	always	“bad”	causes	to	account	for	the	practice	of	pilgrimage	(or	other	practices	involving	strange	beliefs).	The	need	to	determine	the	causes	of	something	designates	this	very	thing	as	an	anomaly;	it	cannot	 expect	 any	other	 consequence	 than	 that	 of	 impoverishing	 the	objects	of	 study.	Therefore,	Claverie	did	not	ask	why	people	believe,	any	more	than	she	even	talked	about																																																									11	Stengers,	Isabelle,	and	Vinciane	Despret.	Women	Who	Make	a	Fuss:	The	Unfaithful	
Daughters	of	Virginia	Woolf,	translated	by	April	Knutson.	(Minneapolis:	Univocal	Press,	2014),	p.	72.	12	Claverie,	Elisabeth.	Les	guerres	de	la	Vierge:	Une	anthropologie	des	apparitions	(Paris,	Gallimard,	2003).	
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beliefs.	 She	 explored	 and	 learned	 with	 people	 how	 they	 think.	 “How	 people	 think”	therefore	became	the	actual	issue	of	her	fieldwork.		What	 Claverie	 did	 in	 this	 regard	 has	 a	 profound	 familiarity	with	 James’s	work	when	he	explored	not	only	the	way	people	think	(be	it	as	a	general	or	a	janitor),	and	how	the	way	they	think	may	matter	for	them,	but	moreover,	I	would	say,	how	they	take	care	
of	 what	matters	 for	 them	with	 thoughts.	 To	 take	 care	 of	 what	 matters	 with	 thoughts	appeared	 to	 me	 to	 be	 a	 first	 thread	 common	 to	 the	 most	 interesting	 and	 creative	fieldwork.		To	 take	 care	 of	 what	 matters	 with	 thoughts	 concretely	 takes	 the	 form,	 in	 the	pilgrims’s	 experiences,	 of	hesitation.	Hesitation	 is	 a	 sign	 that	 identifies	 that	 thought	 is	occurring,	and	that	this	thought	is	taking	care	of	something	that	matters.	The	practice	of	hesitation	may	take	numerous	forms:	the	openly	contradictory	alternation	of	positions,	such	as	how	pilgrims	constantly	alternate,	as	Claverie	notes,	from	“a	critical	position	(it	[the	 apparition]	 is	 not	 there,	 it	 is	 not	 possible)	 to	 a	 position	 of	 belief	 (it	 is	 there,	 it	 is	possible)	 and	 then	 back”13;	 they	 use	 semantics	 or	 syntactic	 devices	 that	 introduce	ambivalence;	 they	 talk	 about	 what	 the	 Virgin	 “makes	 them	 make,”	 undermining	 the	origin	 of	 action;	 and	 more.	 The	 remarkable	 feature	 of	 these	 situations	 is	 thus	 the	deliberate	effort	by	people	to	maintain	this	alternation,	this	ambivalence.		The	hesitation	of	pilgrims	finds	its	echo	in	the	work	of	Claverie	herself:	she	learns	to	hesitate	with	them.	This	is	particularly	clear	when	she	writes	that	her	methodological	choice,	translated	under	the	form	of	an	obligation,	had	become	to	follow	how	“the	actors	establish	what	 they	 consider	 as	 real	 and	 as	 unreal.”14	Claverie’s	 practice,	 for	 all	 these	features,	is	what	Isabelle	Stengers	calls	an	“ecological	practice”:	a	practice	that	takes	into	account	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 inquiry	 participates	 in	 the	 ‘milieu’	 of	 those	 it	 addresses;	therefore,	a	practice	for	which	the	question	of	the	good	‘milieu’	is	crucial.	In	other	words,	it	 is	 a	 practice	 for	which	 the	 practitioner	 is	 herself	 taking	 care	 of	 what	matters	with	thoughts	and	learns	to	create	what	I	would	call	the	relevant	“milieu	of	thought.”			Isabelle	 Stengers	 wrote	 in	 her	 book	 The	 Virgin	 and	 the	Neutrino,	 “To	 fabulate,	 to	 tell	otherwise,	 is	not	to	break	with	 ‘reality’,	but	to	seek	to	make	visible,	 to	make	one	think	and	feel	aspects	of	this	reality,	which	usually	are	taken	as	accessories.”15		The	 creative	 dimension	 I	wish	 to	 be	 the	 hallmark	 of	 every	 fieldwork	may	 take	numerous	forms.	It	may	take	the	form	of	a	device	that	sparks	the	creation	of	thoughts;	it	may	transform	the	relationship	between	the	enquirer	and	the	one	she	is	addressing;	 it	may	 disclose	 some	 dimensions	 of	 the	 situation	 that	 were	 not	 visible	 or	 felt;	 or	 as	 in	Claverie’s	 inquiry	 it	 may	 completely	 redefine	 what	 people	 actually	 do.	 Creativity	 is,	therefore,	both	the	means	and	the	end	of	fieldwork.		I	found	a	beautiful	example	of	this	process	in	a	story	told	by	the	anthropologist	Heonik	Kwon,	with	whom	I	will	conclude.16	Kwon	works	 in	Vietnam	where	he	 studies	 the	 relationship	between	 the	 living	and	 the	dead,	 including	how	souls	of	soldiers	remain	important	in	the	lives	of	the	living.	Kwon	retells	a	story	that	happened	to	him	while	he	was	conducting	his	study,	and	this	story																																																									13	Ibid,	p.	139.	14	Ibid.,	p.	435.	15	Stengers,	Isabelle.	La	Vierge	et	le	Neutrino	(Paris:	La	Découverte,	2006),	p.	169.	
16	Kwon,	Heonik.	Ghosts	of	War	in	Vietnam	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2008).		
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lead	 him	 not	 only	 to	 take	 care	with	 thoughts,	 but	 to	 do	 it	 through	 a	 very	 interesting	fabulation	 that	 could	 help	 him,	 as	 fabulations	 can	 sometimes	 do,	 to	 feel	 and	 to	 think	what	the	situation	requests	from	him.		Kwon	notes	that	in	the	Da	Nang	area,	a	visiting	guest	sometimes	receives,	at	the	end	of	 the	 conversation,	 a	 glass	of	water	 that	 is	 said	 to	be	given	by	a	 spirit.	This	 first	glass,	 ordinary	 water	 from	 an	 ordinary	 well,	 should	 taste	 moderately	 salty.	 If	 you	happen	to	take	another	one	from	the	same	jug,	the	water	tastes	normal	and	fresh.	This	somewhat	 unsettling	 experience	 of	 salty	 water,	 Kwon	 says,	 does	 not	 happen	 to	everyone,	or	every	time.	If	you	have	what	is	known	as	a	“heavy	soul,”	it	is	less	likely	that	you	 taste	 salt	 in	 the	unsalted	water	 –	 considering	 that,	 according	 to	popular	 religious	discourse,	 having	 a	 light	 soul	 refers	 to	 the	 ability	 of	 one’s	 soul	 to	 communicate	 with	other	souls.	But	Kwon	worries:	he	drank	gallons	of	water	and	his	spirit	 tasted	the	salt	only	a	 few	times.	This	surprises	his	 informants:	they	knew	that	he	was	doing	research	on	ghosts,	 so	how	could	a	 student	of	 ghosts	be	 so	 incompetent	 in	 sensing	 the	 taste	of	spirits?17		If	this	question	affects	Kwon,	the	experience	itself	arouses	perplexity.	“How	is	it	that	the	water	from	the	village	well	can	taste	like	diluted	seawater?	For	some	and	not	for	the	others?	Is	 it	my	body	or	soul	that	recognizes	the	salt?	…	If	 I	cannot	sense	the	salty	water	when	others	can,	who	has	the	problem,	them	or	me?”18	These	questions	require	no	solution,	though	one	can	always	respond.	This	is	their	performative	force.	Kwon	notes	this	when	he	writes	that,	to	the	question	of	whether	the	salt	is	in	the	water	or	in	the	mouth	(to	avoid	saying,	in	the	head),	whether	it	is	normal	to	taste	 it	or	not,	and	to	the	question	of	how	to	understand	this	strange	phenomenon,	he	received,	he	says,	no	reasonable	answer.	“Instead,	the	experience	of	phantom	salt	led	me	to	other	events	and	 stories,	 and	my	 thirst	 for	being	able	 to	 taste	 like	others	opened	a	way	 of	 understanding	 these	 events	 and	 stories	 in	 a	 new	 light.”19	One	 of	 the	 most	enduring	 proverbs	 in	 Vietnam	 says:	 “Ancestors	 ate	 too	much	 salt,	 descendants	 desire	water.”	 This	 proverb,	 which	 can	 be	 used	 in	 very	 different	 contexts,	 can	 have	 a	 lot	 of	meaning.	One	of	them	is	connected	with	this	story:	“True	human	desires	…	are	not	those	of	an	isolated	individual.	It	is	the	individual	who	feels	the	desire,	whereas	the	origin	of	the	 desire,	 like	 the	 spirit’s	 phantom	 salt,	 may	 be	 with	 someone	 else,	 for	 it	 is	 in	 the	presence	of	this	other	that	the	water	becomes	salty.	The	desire	to	remember,	 likewise,	can	be	a	desire	that	rises	somewhere	between	the	past	and	the	present	and	something	that	 is	 shared	 between	 the	 remembering	 self	 and	 the	 remembered	 other.	 …	 The	experience	 of	 phantom	 salt	 makes	 the	 intersubjective	 nature	 of	 remembering	somatically	clear.”20		Kwon	performs	a	gesture	that	is	beautiful	and	precious	in	anthropology:	he	lets	himself	be	instructed	by	the	events	that	his	inquiry	creates.	In	the	same	way	that	the	living	may	be	called	by	the	desire	to	remember	the	dead,	without	trying	to	elucidate	from	whom	or	where	this	desire	emanates,	Kwon	lets	himself	be	called	by	the	enigma	of	the	proverb,	or	more	 precisely,	 he	 turns	 the	 proverb	 into	 an	 enigma	 that	 will	 guide	 him	 in	 his	understanding	of	events.	This	is	what	it	means	to	be	instructed:	honouring	the	problem	means	following	it	up	and	letting	oneself	be	led	by	it.	By	transforming	his	questions	into																																																									17	Ibid,	p.	104.	18	Ibid,	p.	104.	19	Ibid,	p.	105.	20	Ibid,	p.105-106.	
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riddles,	 Kwon	 resists	 the	 temptation	 of	 an	 assignation.	 He	 refuses	 to	 dismember	 an	
agencement:	 the	 act	 of	 commemoration	 responds	 to	 a	 desire,	 so	 one	 cannot	 choose	whether	it	emanates	from	the	one	who	is	remembered,	or	the	one	who	takes	charge	of	remembering.21	It	is	a	relation	of	forces	that	holds	together	in	an	event;	the	desire	to	be	remembered	 and	 the	 desire	 to	 remember	 “hold”	 together,	 there	 is	 no	 precedence.	Dismembering	this	agencement	by	giving	ontological	priority	to	the	imagination	of	the	living	–	 “he	would	be	 the	 real	 cause	of	 this	desire”	–	or	 to	 the	will	of	 the	dead,	would	deprive	it	of	all	meaning	and	would	destroy	what	Etienne	Souriau	calls	its	“brilliance	of	reality”	 (“éclat	 suffisant	 de	 réalité”),	 its	 own	 ontological	 strength,	 its	 “way	 of	 being”	(“manière	d’être”)	as	agencement.22	In	his	practice,	Kwon	cultivates	an	essential	virtue	in	these	 situations:	 ontological	 tact.	 Ontological	 tact	 takes	 care	 of	 that	 which	 gives	 the	situation	its	power	to	exist.	Kwon	takes	care	of	what	matters	with	thoughts.	In	other	words,	the	requirement	to	which	Kwon	submits	his	inquiry	is	to	accept	that	 the	 questions	 do	 not	 call	 for	 explanation	 or	 elucidation.	 They	 call	 for	 creations.	These	 are	 riddles,	 that	 is	 to	 say,	 the	 beginnings	 of	 stories	 that	 set	 those	 who	 are	summoned	by	the	enigma	to	work	in	a	very	particular	way:	what	do	we	do	with	this?	To	what	 kinds	 of	 tests	 are	we	 called	 and	what	manner	 of	 living	will	make	 it	 possible	 to	understand	these	riddles?	It	is	still	an	enigma:	it	is	this	that	confers	on	those	who	affect	us	the	power	to	make	us	think.	One	 lets	 oneself	 be	 led,	 as	 does	 Kwon,	 to	 other	 events	 and	 other	 stories,	imagining	 they	were	waiting	 for	 you.	 And	 the	 riddle	was	 both	 the	 key	 and	 the	 guide.	With	Kwon	there	was	no	desire	to	perform	interpretation.	There	were	just	experiments	with	senses	that	could	become	possible.	I	say	the	senses	–	not	meanings	but	tropisms	–	that	 is	 to	 say,	 affects	 that	magnetize	 you,	 forces	 that	 pass	 through	 you	 and	 steer	 you.	This	 is	 an	 experiment,	 a	 trial:	 what	 should	 I	 do	 with	 this?	 What	 kind	 of	 meaning	 is	requested	of	me?	What	 is	my	obligation	to	 the	meaning	I	am	seeking?	What	becoming	should	 I	 offer	 to	 it?	 This	 story	more	 than	 any	 other	 testifies	 to	 what	 happens	 to	 the	anthropologist,	 and	 I	would	 designate	 this	 ‘happening’,	 using	 Stengers’s	 terms,	 as	 the	ecology	 of	 becoming:	 “Becoming	 able	 to	 think	 and	 feel.”	 And,	 therefore,	 this	 is	 not	anymore	about	what	philosophers	can	do	 to	 the	practice	of	 fieldwork,	but	about	what	the	practice	of	fieldwork	may	do	to	philosophers.			
Translated	by	Brett	Buchanan	and	Matthew	Chrulew		
																																																								21	TRANS:	for	Despret’s	concept	of	“agencement,”	see	Vinciane	Despret,	“From	Secret	Agents	to	Interagency.”	History	and	Theory	52.4	(2013):	29-44.	
22	Souriau,	Etienne.	L’instauration	philosophique	(Paris:	Alcan,	1939),	p.	10.		
